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ABSTRACT
Security analysts need to classify, search and correlate numerous images. Automatic classification
tools improve the efficiency of such tasks. Many Image-Matching algorithms are presented in the
litterature. The present paper introduces and provides a Open-Source benchmarking and evaluation
tool for these algorithms. Is this paper, the framework evaluates algorithms on illustrative datasets,
which are constituted of phishing and onion websites. Datasets are provided as Open-Data.
Keywords Threat Intelligence · Phishing · Dataset · Open Data · Open Source · Security · CERT · Incident Response ·
Visual Detection · Automatic classification · Correlation · Clustering
1 Introduction
CERTs - as CIRCL - and security teams collect and process content such as images (at large from photos, screenshots
of websites or screenshots of sandboxes). Datasets become larger - e.g. on average 10000 screenshots of onion domains
websites are scrapped each day in AIL, an analysis tool of information leak - and analysts need to classify, search and
correlate through all the images.
Automatic tools can help them in this task. Less research about image matching and image classification seems to have
been conducted exclusively on websites screenshots. [1][2][3]
Our long-term target is to build a generic library and services which can at least be easily integrated in Threat Intelligence
tools such as AIL1[4] and MISP2[5]. A quick-lookup mechanism for correlation would be necessary and part of
this library. An evaluation framework is provided as Carl-Hauser3 and the open-source library itself is provided as
Douglas-Quaid4.
MISP is an open source software solution tool developed at CIRCL for collecting, storing, distributing and sharing
cyber security indicators and threats about cyber security incidents analysis.
AIL is also an open source modular framework developed at CIRCL to analyze potential information leaks from
unstructured data sources or streams. It can be used, for example, for data leak prevention.
Image-matching algorithms benchmarks already exist [6][7][8] and are highly informative, but none is delivered turnkey.
1Analysis Information Leak framework - github.com/CIRCL/AIL-framework
2Malware Information Sharing Platform - github.com/MISP/MISP
3github.com/CIRCL/carl-hauser
4github.com/CIRCL/douglas-quaid
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1.1 Problem Statement
Figure 1: Carl-Hauser logo
Image correlation for security event correlation purposes is nowadays mainly
manual. No open-source tool provides easy correlations, without regard to the
technology used. Ideally, the extraction of links or correlation between these
images could be fully automated. Even partial automation would reduce the
burden of this task on security teams.
The main contribution of this paper is a free and open-source automated
bench-marking framework for Image-Matching algorithms review.
This paper also presents research results for visual clustering of phishing websites.
2 Datasets
Tests, performances and speed evaluation were conducted using real sets of
pictures. These datasets were extracted from CIRCL’s tools, such as AIL and
URLAbuse. One main dataset was used : circl-phishing-dataset-01 of 470+
pictures.
Phishing datasets is available for research purposes at
https://www.circl.lu/opendata/datasets/circl-phishing-dataset-01
More details about these datasets can be found at ref paper + info link
(a) Phishing dataset overview (470+ pictures)
Figure 2: Dataset’s samples
3 Materials and Methods
In the quest of an use-case-specific Image-matching library, algorithms and approaches are numerous. Benchmarking
each one of them is tough and time-consuming. Therefore, we developed a benchmarking framework. The envisioned
goal is to allow a fast implementation and fast evaluation of any new Image-matching library or algorithm, that could
come up at a later date.
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Figure 3 presents a global overview scheme of the framework. Given an input folder containing pictures (PNG or BMP),
the framework runs all programmed matching algorithms, and returns a series of outputs (quality, timing measure ...).
For quality measure, a ground truth file needs to be provided. This file can easily be built with VisJS-Classificator[9]5.
The framework explores the parameters space of the algorithms, by generating configuration files on the go.
These configuration files are read by an execution handler which takes care of the general pipework, including monitoring
mechanisms and feeding the configuration file to the core computation handler. This core computation handler is an
overwritten version of few abstract methods, specific to used library.
Pre and post computations can be enabled or disabled and are part of the configuration : OCR, text-hider (Fig.7), image
conversion, edge detection ...
Output
Input
Launcher 
outputs
Execution handler
Configuration file Preprocessing Precomputation andcore computation Postprocessing
XXX.latex.overview
XXX.inclusion.matrixXXX.overview
XXX.quality.matrix
outputs
Wrapper 
folder of .png or
 .bmp pictures
ground_truth.json
XXX.graphe.json
XXX.conf
XXX.stats
Figure 3: Global overview of benchmarking framework
(a) Original picture (b) Painted picture
Figure 4: Available pre-computation example - Text hider
Datastructure and functions to store, compute, measure, etc. in an unified way are available in utility classes. The
execution handler outputs three major elements :
• A statistics datastructure : including execution time, pre-computation time, matching time (total and per
element), memory consumption, matching quality metrics ...
• A graph datastructure : each picture matched with another one share a common edge. Nodes are input pictures.
The generated graph can directly be read and displayed with tool such as VisJS-Classificator [9]
• A configuration datastructure : copy of the generated configuration file that conducted to this result
One can activate the picture exportation of each pair of pictures matched together. This option is not activated by
default, due to the high disk-space and computation time (mainly I/O access). However, this output is really relevant to
manually spot drawbacks of algorithms. Figure 5 is an example of such output.
After all configuration being evaluated, a wrapper performs a reporting about executed experiments by merging
per-configuration results (execution time, quality ..) in unified views. These views are:
5Open-source and built-for-the-occasion manual image classification tool - github.com/Vincent-CIRCL/visjs_classificator
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• An overview : a list of configuration name and quality measures, sorted by quality
• A LATEX overview : same list as previous one, formatted as a LATEX-ready table
• An inclusion matrix : a matrix displays the inclusion factor between output graphs. This allows to spot which
algorithm is similar to which other algorithm (strictly, its output is included). An instance of the intersection
matrix is provided in Appendix 10.
• A quality per pair matrix : by pairing algorithms output per 2 and evaluating the merged graph, it generates a
quick overview of which algorithms pairing is wise
Please note that Figure 3 presents only an high level view of the framework. Implementation is more precisely described
in Annex 8.
(a) The upper central logo is not matched correctly as the best matching picture (2nd from the left) does not include it
(b) Login form is matched correctly, as the first matches are similar pictures, even with missing buttons
(c) The form is matched with other forms, but none identical to original one.
Figure 5: Request picture (on the left) and top matches (on the right, top 1 to top 3 from left to right).
4 Results
4.1 Used libraries
In the following, we’re going to present few relevant visualisation of the framework outputs, as well as overview results
as described previously.
Few Image matching libraries were tested, including :
• ImageHash6 which includes a wide list of fuzzy hash algorithm such as AHash, DHash, PHash, WHash, ...
The purpose of these algorithms is to map input files (here, images) into a limited hash space, such that two
"similar" images have similar hashes. Their objective is therefore distinct from traditional hash algorithms,
which seek to maximize the difference between hashes for even a minimal difference (ultimately, 1 bit) in the
input file.
• TLSH7[10] is also a fuzzy hashing algorithm, available in its own library.
• OpenCV8 is an open source computer vision and machine learning software library, which provides a common
infrastructure for computer vision applications. Relevant algorithms are available within it, such as SIFT
[11][12] (Scale-invariant Feature Transform), SURF [13] (Speeded Up Robust Features), ORB [14] (Oriented
6github.com/JohannesBuchner/imagehash
7github.com/trendmicro/tlsh
8github.com/opencv/opencv
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FAST and Rotated BRIEF) ... These algorithms use key point descriptors, a way to condense distributed and
locally relevant information, into a vector or set of vectors. These vectors can then be compared. However,
we focused on open-source implementations and avoided patented implementation. SIFT and SURF were
therefore outside of the scope. Thanks to a large performance overview [15] we chose to primarily focus on
ORB.
Few tips to analyze ORB-matching pictures :
• Parrallel lines (if there is not rotation) are indicators of quality matching. It keeps the spatial consistency
between source and candidate pictures.
• Text seems to be a problem. Letters are matched to letters, generating false positive. It also "uses" descriptor
space (number of descriptors is artificially limited), and so, hinders true logo (for example) to be described and
used.
Graph visualization is valuable to spot unexpected matches or mismatches and quickly navigate through all pictures
[16]. Even if this kind of visualization is hard to scale up to billion of pictures, it is still a relevant tool.
4.2 Examples
4.2.1 Fuzzy Hash and ORB
Two examples are presented. Figure 6b presents a mainly correct matching graph including one mismatching edge.
This means that the library (here, W-Hash from ImageHash) had correctly detected Microsoft forms as being the sames,
but incorrectly gave a Microsoft form as being the closest picture of the white webpage on the right.
Figure 6a presents a match on logo, between globally very different pictures. This means that even if the global look of
pictures is different, the algorithm (here, ORB from OpenCV) correctly matched common parts of these screenshots
(forms, logo in the corner ...)
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(a) Good brand matching even with different backgrounds. Logo
is present on each picture in upper-left corner - ORB
(b) Graph visualisation of Microsoft phishing web-
sites - WHash
(c) Matches lines between text and forms’ corners
Figure 6: Graph visualization and successes
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(a) Good matching on brand even with disturbed background
(b) Mismatch due to text/font matching - ORB
(c) Perfect match on Microsoft form
Figure 7: Graph visualization and issues
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4.2.2 ORB and RANSAC
RANSAC outputs a homography between two compared pictures. RANSAC ouputs a homography with a transformation
matrix, which also determines which matches are insiders and which are outliers. A ’strong transformation’ is a
significant rotation/translation/scale-up or down/deformation. A ’light transformation’ is a near direct translation,
without rotation, scaling or deformation. Figure 11 and ?? are examples.
The transformation matrix applied to the first picture generates a new picture that "fits" the second picture it is compared
to. Displaying the first picture with its transformation gives an idea of "how much" the first picture should be transformed.
If the transformation is strong (high distortion) then the match is probably low. Examples are presented in Figure 9.
Please note that the usual name for this operation is "Reprojection error".
Even if an Homography is an interesting tool, it can provides a very wide range of result. Transformation can be
"infinite" and so results to false matches. On the contrary, in a real-world context, object can have perspective. An
affine transformation could be more relevant in our case, as in screenshots, the "depth" won’t be used.
(a) Explanation of RANSAC visualisation created by the test framework
Figure 8: ORB and RANSAC algorithm
A few other matches are displayed in Figure 11. These matches were challenging : various range of colors between
pictures of the same category, various backgrounds, etc.
8
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(a) Near no transformation needed. Should be detected as good match.
(b) Light distortion. Should be detected as good match.
(c) High distortion. Could be accepted as a false positive.
(d) Butterfly pattern with a very heavy transformation. Should be a negative match. Note that the distance score (0.95)
would have been very under the expected threshold of 0.96 and therefore not discarded without matrix analysis.
(e) Very high distortion, should be discarded.
Figure 9: Matrix transformation visualisation - ORB - RANSAC Filtering - Visualisation of transformation matrix
applied to request picture. From left to right : database picture (example), target picture (request), deformed target
picture thanks to RANSAC transformation matrix
9
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(a) Match on the form and the relative space between its components
(b) Strong deformation for the first two matches. Low deformation for the third row.
Figure 10: The first column is the candidate picture, second column is the request picture, third column is the transformed
request picture "to match the candidate picture". Less stretched is the best.
10
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(a) Good match over logo. However one match is above the
"critical threshold" of 0.96 (b) Good match for Outlook, but also above the threshold.
(c) Cluster of Outlook pictures, separated to others by a link above
the 0.97 threshold. (d) Good cluster of simple blue forms
Figure 11: Results - ORB - RANSAC Filtering - No matrix filter
11
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5 Challenges
We drawn a few conclusions and encountered a few problems, that need to be discussed for further improvements:
• ORB can be very sensitive to input parameters. Fuzzy-hash algorithms have few parameters and so give
consistent but untweakable results;
• ORB outperforms fuzzy-hash algorithms in almost all sounds configuration (about 10% more true positive
matches);
• Even if some fuzzy hashes algorithms should not be sensitive to input format (due to internal conversion), it
seems that input format generate difference in output results. Uncompressed format (e.g. BMP) gives best
results;
• Fuzzy Hashs algorithms are quite insensitive to text and high frequency noise. Even if this fact seems to be
obvious, it is confirmed by the benchmark;
• Text noise is a huge issue to feature-matching. This usually does not constitute a problem on natural-scenes
used to evaluate these algorithms such as SIFT[11][12], SURF[13], ORB[14][17], ... However text is prominent
in screenshots. This leads to mismatch and unreasonable results. See Figure ??. ORB is highly sensitive to
text, as corners detectors are detecting corners in each letter. This drawback generates false positive matches
and so less true positive matches, in our settings. Hiding the text (blur boxes, mean color boxes, black or white
color boxes, ... detected by OCR or DeepLearning approaches) does not fundamentally changes the quality of
ORB detection. OCR and Text-hider preprocessing can partially prevent this issue. It seems that the increment
in performance is bounded by the imperfectness of OCR used to detected the text to hide. The main challenge
for the text-hider is to remove only irrelevant text, while keeping logos and distinctive typography. OCR can
detect logos as text, and so hides it, leading to less information for ORB to correctly match pictures. Please
note that no matching had been done on extracted text.
• Speed-wise and Memory-wise, ORB needs order of magnitude more resources (10−3 seconds for hashes,
100 seconds for ORB) than fuzzy-hashs algorithms. This gap is greatly reduced, without a drop of ORB
performances, by using Bag-Of-Word/Bag-of-Pictures approaches. Instead of performing O(N2) comparison
per pair of picture (N being the number of descriptor per picture), we can only perform the comparison in
constant time, by boiling down N descriptors in a boolean array representing few chosen descriptor presences.
• RANSAC filtering - verifying homography quality between two matched pictures, which boils down to "Does
the picture A needs to be stretched a lot to match picture B ?" - provides the best results of the benchmark, but
cost the most (101 seconds for ORB + RANSAC).
• Scalability : Hash-based comparison are order of magnitude faster than feature-matching algorithm. Even if
our current implementation is in a test-state - where preformance is not a main objective - scalability constitutes
a lurking and rising issue. Trying to get the closest picture of each one of a 5000 pictures dataset took 10H
with the most "advanced" configuration (ORB+RANSAC based) on a 32 cores, 120Gb RAM server.
• Base model : Image matching or Image classification? While establish correlation between pictures is the
main goal, both approach seems to be able to satisfy it. However, solutions and approaches seems radically
different. The final library may use an hybrid approach.
• Algorithm combination and scoring : Merging algorithms results is a great problem. Their score range is
diverse, and even if normalization is doable, the meaning of the score is different. One algorithm can provide a
reliable matching if the score is below 0.2 and another one if the score is below 0.6. Therefore, merging results
is not only a mathematical issue.
• Unreachable funnel approach : A funnel of algorithm approach is not adapted to our objective, given current
results. This means that using most scalable algorithms first and most-computing-intensive algorithms at
the end, while discarding irrelevant candidate picture during the progression in the funnel, is not usable.
Correlation between algorithms output is not prevalent and so, what is discarded by one could be matched by
another one.
6 Future work
Problems presented previously lead to a list of future possible developments :
• Extending provided datasets to support research effort
• Combining algorithms outputs in an unified and relevant way, to leverage each algorithm main strength
• Increasing the list of evaluated algorithms, to leverage new main strength
• Create a challenging dataset with scale/blur/negative/color-changed/.. screenshoots-like pictures, to evaluate
the quality of our algorithms combination on edge-cases
• Evaluate and improve the scalability of the framework, to faster evaluate wider datasets
12
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• Add more pre and post computation : filter out image, merge image distance, modified edge detector, spatial
clustering of descriptors ... to understand what can be done to improve matching quality
• Time and Memory performance evaluation regarding size of the dataset, to anticipates calculation needs and at
which dataset size the framework hits the "complexity wall"
7 Conclusion
7.1 Summary
This research paper proposes that even partial automation of screenshots classification would reduce the burden on
security teams.
The presented evaluation framework is available online at github.com/CIRCL/carl-hauser.
Research results were presented along with encountered issues. Algorithms modification are still being performed to
solve met issues and improve overall quality of the future library. The issues and their solution presented in this paper
constitute a starting point on the path to the creation of a matching and clustering library, intended to be used in Open
Source tools.
In the context of this paper, these results represents above all a usage example of the provided datasets.
7.2 Contact information
If you have a complaint related to the dataset or the processing over it, please contact us. We aim to be transparent, not
only about how we process but also about rights that are linked to such information and processing. You can contact us
at circl.lu/contact/ for request about the dataset itself, regarding elements of the dataset, or extension requests. You can
contact us at same address or on github for feedback about the benchmarking framework, methodology or relevant
ideas/inquiries.
13
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Part I
Appendices
8 Detailed view of the framework
The exact implementation differs on some points with the idealized overview presented in the paper body. For example,
core computation handler and execution handler is one element, which can entirely be overwritten. This allows a more
flexible and adaptable framework to new algorithms, as each one may need to overwrite larger part of the execution
handler.
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9 Result table
Following table present raw results reduced to best algorithms.
A shortened results table is provided, with algorithms evaluated as "best ones" on the phishing dataset. This dataset was
composed of 207 screenshots of phishing websites. The pre-computation time is the hashing or feature-description
time. The matching time is the elapsed time between a request picture and a best-match answer from the algorithm. As
explained in previously in the paper body, the true positive rate is the inclusion rate between the output graph of the
algorithm and the ground truth graph.
Values are normalized thanks to the maximum obtainable score for this version of the score evaluation. Evaluated
algorithms always give a match for a given image, even for outliers, which has no outbound link in the ground truth
graph. So even in the best case the algorithm has a bounded maximum score.
NAME (PARAMETERS) TRUE POSITIVE (norm.) PRE COMPUTING (s) MATCHING (s)
ORB 500 LEN MAX NO FILTER STD BRUTE FORCE ENA. 0.65263 (0.77641) 0.04624 1.9087
ORB 500 LEN MIN FAR THR. KNN 2 FLANN LSH ENA. 0.64211 (0.76389) 0.04634 1.1203
ORB 500 LEN MIN FAR THR. KNN 2 FLANN LSH DIS. 0.63684 (0.75762) 0.04614 1.12314
ORB 500 LEN MAX FAR THR. KNN 2 FLANN LSH ENA. 0.63158 (0.75136) 0.05965 1.26475
ORB 500 LEN MAX FAR THR. KNN 2 FLANN LSH DIS. 0.62632 (0.74511) 0.04613 1.12695
ORB 500 LEN MIN RATIO KNN 2 FLANN LSH DIS. 0.61053 (0.72632) 0.04764 1.19758
ORB 500 LEN MIN RATIO KNN 2 FLANN LSH ENA. 0.60526 (0.72005) 0.04787 1.14532
D HASH 0.60386 (0.71839) 0.06124 0.00214
A HASH 0.57971 (0.68966) 0.06268 0.00218
D HASH VERTICAL 0.57488 (0.68391) 0.05934 0.00216
ORB 500 LEN MIN NO FILTER STD BRUTE FORCE ENABLED 0.56842 (0.67622) 0.0452 2.08476
P HASH 0.56039 (0.66667) 0.06403 0.00244
W HASH 0.53623 (0.63793) 0.1221 0.00205
P HASH SIMPLE 0.52657 (0.62644) 0.06377 0.00222
ORB 500 LEN MAX RATIO BAD STD BRUTE FORCE ENABLED 0.46316 (0.55101) 0.0445 1.68615
ORB 500 LEN MIN RATIO BAD STD BRUTE FORCE ENABLED 0.45263 (0.53847) 0.0445 2.15439
TLSH 0.42512 (0.50575) 0.00498 0.00096
TLSH NO LENGTH 0.40580 (0.48276) 0.00494 0.0011
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NAME TRUE POSITIVE PRE COMPUTING (s) MATCHING (s)
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX NO FILTER STD BRUTE FORCE ENABLED 0.65263 0.04624 1.9087
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN FAR THREESHOLD KNN 2 BRUTE FORCE DISABLED 0.64737 0.06641 1.23615
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN RATIO CORRECT KNN 2 BRUTE FORCE DISABLED 0.64737 0.05256 1.17277
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX RATIO CORRECT KNN 2 BRUTE FORCE DISABLED 0.64737 0.04775 1.34641
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX FAR THREESHOLD KNN 2 BRUTE FORCE DISABLED 0.64737 0.06434 1.20571
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN FAR THREESHOLD KNN 2 FLANN LSH ENABLED 0.64211 0.04634 1.1203
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN FAR THREESHOLD KNN 2 FLANN LSH DISABLED 0.63684 0.04614 1.12314
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX FAR THREESHOLD KNN 2 FLANN LSH ENABLED 0.63158 0.05965 1.26475
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX FAR THREESHOLD KNN 2 FLANN LSH DISABLED 0.62632 0.04613 1.12695
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN RATIO CORRECT KNN 2 FLANN LSH DISABLED 0.61053 0.04764 1.19758
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX RATIO CORRECT KNN 2 FLANN LSH DISABLED 0.61053 0.04769 1.13552
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN RATIO CORRECT KNN 2 FLANN LSH ENABLED 0.60526 0.04787 1.14532
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX RATIO CORRECT KNN 2 FLANN LSH ENABLED 0.60526 0.04742 1.11723
raw phishing PNG D HASH 0.60386 0.06124 0.00214
raw phishing PNG A HASH 0.57971 0.06268 0.00218
raw phishing PNG D HASH VERTICAL 0.57488 0.05934 0.00216
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN NO FILTER STD BRUTE FORCE ENABLED 0.56842 0.0452 2.08476
raw phishing PNG P HASH 0.56039 0.06403 0.00244
raw phishing PNG W HASH 0.53623 0.1221 0.00205
raw phishing PNG P HASH SIMPLE 0.52657 0.06377 0.00222
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX RATIO BAD STD BRUTE FORCE ENABLED 0.46316 0.0445 1.68615
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN RATIO BAD STD BRUTE FORCE ENABLED 0.45263 0.0445 2.15439
raw phishing PNG TLSH 0.42512 0.00498 0.00096
raw phishing PNG TLSH NO LENGTH 0.4058 0.00494 0.0011
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX RATIO BAD STD FLANN LSH ENABLED 0.30526 0.05724 1.50447
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX RATIO BAD STD BRUTE FORCE DISABLED 0.3 0.07377 1.17801
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN RATIO BAD STD BRUTE FORCE DISABLED 0.28947 0.04555 0.99388
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX RATIO BAD STD FLANN LSH DISABLED 0.27368 0.14438 1.56765
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN RATIO BAD STD FLANN LSH ENABLED 0.27368 0.05961 1.47452
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN RATIO BAD STD FLANN LSH DISABLED 0.26842 0.04805 1.17483
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX NO FILTER STD FLANN LSH ENABLED 0.06842 0.05417 1.1589
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX NO FILTER STD FLANN LSH DISABLED 0.05789 0.04719 1.34306
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX NO FILTER STD BRUTE FORCE DISABLED 0.02105 0.0631 1.14467
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN NO FILTER STD FLANN LSH DISABLED 0.00526 0.05679 1.18021
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN NO FILTER STD FLANN LSH ENABLED 0.00526 0.04684 1.08095
raw phishing PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN NO FILTER STD BRUTE FORCE DISABLED 0.0 0.04518 0.95656
NAME TRUE POSITIVE PRE COMPUTING (sec) MATCHING (sec)
raw phishing bmp BMP ORB 500 LEN MAX NO FILTER STD BRUTE FORCE ENABLED 0.64737 0.07296 2.52043
raw phishing bmp BMP D HASH 0.60386 0.02017 0.00224
raw phishing bmp BMP TLSH 0.58937 0.08356 0.00093
raw phishing bmp BMP A HASH 0.57971 0.02544 0.00245
raw phishing bmp BMP TLSH NO LENGTH 0.57005 0.0856 0.00114
raw phishing bmp BMP D HASH VERTICAL 0.56522 0.01986 0.00228
raw phishing bmp BMP ORB 500 LEN MIN NO FILTER STD BRUTE FORCE ENABLED 0.55789 0.04995 2.40043
raw phishing bmp BMP P HASH 0.55072 0.02438 0.00232
raw phishing bmp BMP W HASH 0.54106 0.09857 0.00221
raw phishing bmp BMP P HASH SIMPLE 0.52174 0.02224 0.00233
raw phishing bmp BMP ORB 500 LEN MAX RATIO BAD STD BRUTE FORCE ENABLED 0.45263 0.0637 2.45745
raw phishing bmp BMP ORB 500 LEN MIN RATIO BAD STD BRUTE FORCE ENABLED 0.44211 0.06207 2.39609
raw phishing bmp BMP ORB 500 LEN MAX RATIO BAD STD BRUTE FORCE DISABLED 0.28421 0.05223 1.45008
raw phishing bmp BMP ORB 500 LEN MIN RATIO BAD STD BRUTE FORCE DISABLED 0.27368 0.06659 1.3083
raw phishing bmp BMP ORB 500 LEN MAX NO FILTER STD BRUTE FORCE DISABLED 0.01579 0.0531 1.43634
raw phishing bmp BMP ORB 500 LEN MIN NO FILTER STD BRUTE FORCE DISABLED 0.0 0.05253 1.17698
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NAME TRUE POSITIVE PRE COMPUTING (sec) MATCHING (sec)
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX NO FILTER STD BRUTE FORCE ENABLED 0.59474 0.04536 1.5378
raw phishing COLORED PNG P HASH 0.58937 0.04627 0.00233
raw phishing COLORED PNG D HASH VERTICAL 0.57488 0.04983 0.00236
raw phishing COLORED PNG D HASH 0.57488 0.04925 0.00301
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN NO FILTER STD BRUTE FORCE ENABLED 0.56842 0.0739 2.11373
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX RATIO CORRECT KNN 2 BRUTE FORCE
DISABLED
0.55789 0.0439 0.86356
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX FAR THREESHOLD KNN 2 BRUTE FORCE
DISABLED
0.55789 0.0439 0.86493
raw phishing COLORED PNG A HASH 0.55072 0.04406 0.00229
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN RATIO CORRECT KNN 2 BRUTE FORCE
DISABLED
0.54737 0.04379 0.85381
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN FAR THREESHOLD KNN 2 BRUTE FORCE
DISABLED
0.54737 0.04405 0.85917
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX FAR THREESHOLD KNN 2 FLANN LSH
ENABLED
0.54737 0.04403 1.08197
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX FAR THREESHOLD KNN 2 FLANN LSH
DISABLED
0.54211 0.04388 1.084
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX RATIO CORRECT KNN 2 FLANN LSH
ENABLED
0.53684 0.04413 1.08097
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN FAR THREESHOLD KNN 2 FLANN LSH
DISABLED
0.53684 0.0441 1.07795
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX RATIO CORRECT KNN 2 FLANN LSH
DISABLED
0.53158 0.0439 1.08247
raw phishing COLORED PNG P HASH SIMPLE 0.52657 0.04703 0.00298
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN FAR THREESHOLD KNN 2 FLANN LSH
ENABLED
0.52105 0.04423 1.08245
raw phishing COLORED PNG W HASH 0.51208 0.11247 0.00229
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN RATIO CORRECT KNN 2 FLANN LSH
ENABLED
0.51053 0.04389 1.0917
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN RATIO CORRECT KNN 2 FLANN LSH
DISABLED
0.5 0.0438 1.08247
raw phishing COLORED PNG TLSH 0.47826 0.00513 0.00096
raw phishing COLORED PNG TLSH NO LENGTH 0.45411 0.00508 0.00111
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX RATIO BAD STD BRUTE FORCE ENABLED 0.44737 0.0706 2.30236
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN RATIO BAD STD BRUTE FORCE ENABLED 0.38947 0.0676 2.39523
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN RATIO BAD STD FLANN LSH ENABLED 0.24211 0.04551 1.05413
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX RATIO BAD STD FLANN LSH ENABLED 0.24211 0.04491 1.04322
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX RATIO BAD STD FLANN LSH DISABLED 0.24211 0.04502 1.05124
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN RATIO BAD STD FLANN LSH DISABLED 0.24211 0.04556 1.05038
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN RATIO BAD STD BRUTE FORCE DISABLED 0.23684 0.04937 1.31014
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX RATIO BAD STD BRUTE FORCE DISABLED 0.23684 0.05403 1.20556
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX NO FILTER STD FLANN LSH ENABLED 0.05789 0.04412 0.99475
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX NO FILTER STD FLANN LSH DISABLED 0.03684 0.04388 0.99439
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MAX NO FILTER STD BRUTE FORCE DISABLED 0.02105 0.05104 0.8506
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN NO FILTER STD FLANN LSH DISABLED 0.0 0.0444 0.99507
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN NO FILTER STD BRUTE FORCE DISABLED 0.0 0.08486 1.23023
raw phishing COLORED PNG ORB 500 LEN MIN NO FILTER STD FLANN LSH ENABLED 0.0 0.04395 0.99463
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10 Intersection matrix
Iratio =
](Re ∩Gt)
](Re)
(1)
With Iratio being the intersection ratio, Re being one algorithm output graph edges, Gt being the ground truth graph
edges or another algorithm output graph edges. The true-positive score of an algorithm output is computed as the
intersection ratio between one algorithm output and the ground truth graph.
Ground truth graph has clique 9 [18] of similar nodes. It also has outliers which don’t have any link with other
nodes. This implies that algorithms which always give a matching picture to a given request picture (in other words
algorithms which can’t say "There is no match") can’t reach the maximum score. Some nodes will have edges that
will never be "good" as their equivalent node in the ground truth graph have no outbound edge. Some guess will
always be wrong if a guess is forced. Therefore, a normalization is applied (Table 9) to raw true-positive rates as
normalized_score = raw_score/max_score.
For all given algorithm, we compute the intersection of their outputs in pairs, thanks to Formula 1. The matrix is
presented in Figure 13. The larger the intersection between an Algorithm A (y-axis) and an Algorithm B (x-axis), the
"more similar" their output will be, the darker the square of their intersection will be.
We see that numerous ORB-configuration are similar (homogeneous dark bottom-right square), while most hash-based
algorithms have similar outputs (somewhat homogeneous mid-dark top-left square). We also see that hash-based
algorithms and ORB-based configuration have quite different outputs (homogeneous light areas). Therefore, combination
of hash-based algorithms and ORB-based configuration may be complementary.
The evaluation had been conducted on the rank-1 matching guess provided for each algorithm for each request picture.
9Clique : subset of nodes of a graph where every two distinct nodes are adjacent
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Figure 13: Intersection matrix - Guess of rank 1 for each image comparison CONCATENE AND MAKE IT MORE
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